Which access logs and audit evidence you need for ISO 27001 certification, and how they integrate with the SIEM
For ISO/IEC 27001 certification you do not need to "have logs": you need to be able to demonstrate, for each Annex A control concerning access, which event constitutes its evidence, with which fields, for how long it is retained and who cannot alter it. The minimum core is successful and failed authentications, second-factor events, session lifecycle, changes to access rights and administrative actions — each with actor, object, UTC timestamp, origin, outcome and tenant and project context.
Step 1 — From controls to events
The Annex A controls of the 2022 revision do not list log events: they describe objectives. The work is translating each objective into the evidence that demonstrates it, and this table is the document worth taking into the audit.
| Control | Subject | Evidence to produce |
|---|---|---|
| 5.15 Access control | Access rules defined and enforced | Per project and role policies, plus access decision logs |
| 5.16 Identity management | Identity lifecycle | Subject creation, modification, suspension and deactivation events |
| 5.17 Authentication information | Management of credentials and second factors | 2FA activation, credential change, recovery and backup code generation events |
| 5.18 Access rights | Assignment and periodic review of rights | Role assignment logs plus periodic reconciliation reports |
| 5.14 Information transfer | Protection of data in transit | Encrypted channel configuration and its verification |
| 8.5 Secure authentication | Robustness of the authentication process | Successful and failed authentication events, lockouts, second-factor usage |
| 8.15 Logging | Recording of relevant events and their protection | Event catalogue, fields, retention, integrity controls |
| 8.16 Monitoring activities | Detection of anomalous behaviour | Correlation rules active in the SIEM and the alerts they raise |
| 8.24 Use of cryptography | Appropriate use of cryptographic mechanisms | Algorithms and key management, token signing, credential protection |
Step 2 — The fields every record must carry
A log missing one of these fields is not useless, but it is not correlatable: and correlation is what separates an archive from a control.
| Field | Content | Why it is needed |
|---|---|---|
| UTC timestamp | Event instant with explicit timezone | Correlate sources across timezones without ambiguity |
| Event type | Stable, machine-readable identifier | Build rules that do not break every time a label changes |
| Actor | Identifier of the acting subject | Answer the 'who' question |
| Object | Identifier of the affected subject or resource | Distinguish acting on oneself from acting on another user |
| Outcome | Succeeded, failed, denied by policy | Failures are more informative than successes |
| Origin | IP address and user agent | Detect anomalous origins and parallel sessions |
| Context | Tenant and project | Scope investigations to a single customer in multi-tenant environments |
| Session identifier | Session reference | Reconstruct a chain of events as one story |
| Event identifier | Unique key | Deduplicate repeated deliveries and reference the event in a report |
{
"id": "evt_7c1e2f",
"type": "subject.authentication_failed",
"createdAt": "2026-09-10T09:24:00Z",
"tenant": "https://tenant.example.com",
"data": {
"subjectId": "sub_9f2a7c",
"project": "prj_12ab",
"outcome": "failed",
"reason": "invalid_second_factor",
"sourceIp": "203.0.113.42",
"sessionId": "ses_1a9c4d"
}
}The subject is an opaque reference, not a name: the association with the person lives in the customer tenant. That is a useful property for the SIEM too, because it allows correlation without replicating personal data into a second system.
Step 3 — Retention, without the myths
One clarification that saves arguments: ISO 27001 does not mandate a log retention period. It mandates that the period be defined against business, legal and contractual requirements, that it be documented and that logs be protected throughout. The durations circulating as mandatory come from other frameworks or sector practices.
| Event category | Reference duration | Typical rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication (successful and failed) | 12 months | Covers a full audit cycle and retrospective investigations |
| Second-factor events | 12-24 months | Key evidence when an access is disputed |
| Access rights changes | Relationship duration + limitation period | They show when a privilege was granted and revoked |
| Administrative actions | 24 months | Highest impact, lowest frequency events |
| Sessions | 3-6 months | High volume, investigative value concentrated in the short term |
The middle column holds reference values, not prescriptions: the point is that your organisation picks its own, justifies them and honours them. An auditor accepts a justified 6 months; they do not accept 24 months declared and 30 days in practice.
Step 4 — Integrity: the forgotten control
Control 8.15 requires logs to be protected from tampering and unauthorised access. Translated into verifiable requirements:
- Append-only writing: no application path modifies or deletes an already recorded event.
- Separation of duties: whoever administers the system does not administer the log store.
- Immediate forwarding to a third system, so a compromise of the source does not erase the history.
- Time synchronisation via NTP, otherwise the timeline reconstruction of an incident does not hold.
- Tracing access to the logs themselves: consulting them is an event too.
Forwarding to a third system is the most effective requirement and the most often skipped: if logs stay only in the system producing them, whoever takes control of that system also controls the evidence.
A special case: actions the system does not allow
In architectures where certain operations do not exist — in LoginMaster no administrator can reset a password or disable a user's second factor — the corresponding control is demonstrated differently and more strongly: not with the log of an authorised action, but with the absence of the function from the system. You bring the architectural description to the auditor, and the question "who reset this credential?" needs no answer because it has no possible cases. Details on authentication vendors that cannot read passwords.
Step 5 — Getting events into the SIEM
LoginMaster records all security-relevant event categories — authentication, second-factor verification, sessions, administration, security — and makes them available to applications through HMAC-SHA256 signed webhooks and REST APIs. The native connector to enterprise SIEMs, with Syslog CEF over TLS and per-category selection, is on the roadmap: the current status is on the SIEM integration page. In the meantime forwarding is implemented by consuming the webhooks and relaying events to the collector, which is the pattern most custom integrations use anyway.
POST /v1/projects/prj_12ab/webhooks HTTP/1.1
Host: api.loginmaster.it
Authorization: Bearer ak_live_••••••••
Content-Type: application/json
{
"url": "https://collector.example.com/hooks/loginmaster",
"events": [
"subject.authenticated",
"subject.role_changed",
"subject.deactivated"
]
}Field normalisation is the step that makes events usable alongside other sources. The minimum mapping to the most common schemas:
| Event field | CEF | Elastic Common Schema |
|---|---|---|
| type | cat / name | event.action |
| createdAt | rt | @timestamp |
| data.subjectId | suser | user.id |
| data.outcome | outcome | event.outcome |
| data.sourceIp | src | source.ip |
| tenant | cs1 | organization.id |
| data.project | cs2 | service.name |
| id | externalId | event.id |
Step 6 — The correlation rules to enable
Control 8.16 is about monitoring, not archiving: a SIEM that receives events and does not correlate them satisfies logging, not monitoring. These are the rules covering the most relevant access scenarios, and the ones an auditor expects to find active.
| Rule | Condition | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| Brute force | N failed authentications on the same subject in a short window | Dictionary attack on a known account |
| Credential stuffing | Failures across many different subjects from the same origin | Reuse of leaked credentials |
| Impossible travel | Two successful authentications from geographically incompatible origins | Shared credentials or a stolen session |
| Second factor bypassed | Successful authentication with no second-factor event on a project requiring it | Misconfiguration or an alternative path |
| Privilege escalation | An administrative role assigned outside the expected process | Abuse of an administrative account |
| Dormant account reactivated | Successful authentication after long inactivity | Use of a forgotten but never disabled account |
| Out-of-hours administrative activity | Administrative actions outside the operating window | Unauthorised access or an undeclared automation |
| Repeated recovery attempts | Several credential recovery requests on the same subject | Social engineering in progress |
Every rule should be exercised with a controlled test and the result archived: proof that the rule works is more convincing than the rule itself.
Audit day: what gets asked
- 1'Show me every access by this user in the last 90 days.' It must be a query, not a manual extraction.
- 2'Who assigned this administrative role, and when?' You need the actor, not just the change.
- 3'How do you prove nobody altered these logs?' Append-only, separation of duties, external forwarding.
- 4'Show me the last periodic review of access rights.' The dated reconciliation report.
- 5'What happens when someone attempts a brute-force attack?' Active rule, alert raised, test outcome.
- 6'How long do you retain these events and where is that written?' The policy, and evidence it is honoured.
- 7'Who can reset a user's credentials?' If the answer is 'nobody, the function does not exist', the entire following family of questions falls away.
The reconciliation report mentioned in point four comes from automating the lifecycle: the procedure is in User provisioning and lifecycle via REST API and SDK. The overall compliance picture, including NIS2 and GDPR, is on compliance.
Comparing collection approaches
| Aspect | Scattered application logs | Self-hosted IdP | Managed IAM platform |
|---|---|---|---|
| Completeness | Each application records what its team decided | Complete on the IdP, to be integrated for the rest | Homogeneous event catalogue across all projects |
| Format | Heterogeneous, normalised by hand | Consistent | Consistent and documented |
| Integrity | The application team can modify its own logs | Depends on configuration | Append-only events, forwardable in real time |
| Multi-tenant context | To be added | Per realm | Native: tenant and project in every event |
| Evidence on credentials | Log of the administrative reset | Log of the administrative reset | No administrative reset to trace: it does not exist |
| Audit preparation cost | High: manual reconstruction | Medium | Low: the control-to-event map is already defined |
Who wrote this guide
LoginMaster is the IAM platform of CDBKR S.r.l., an Italian company that designs and operates authentication infrastructure for software houses, MSPs and European enterprise organisations, with specific attention to European compliance requirements. The event categories cited are those published on SIEM integration, and the full regulatory picture is on compliance. To discuss a certification path: contact us.
Frequently asked questions
The minimum core covers successful and failed authentications, second-factor events (activation, verification, recovery, backup codes), session lifecycle, access rights changes and administrative actions. Every record must carry actor, object, UTC timestamp, origin, outcome, tenant and project context and a unique identifier. What the standard really asks for is not the event list but the map linking each Annex A control to the evidence that demonstrates it.
The standard does not mandate a duration. It mandates that the duration be defined against business, legal and contractual requirements, documented, and that logs be protected throughout. Durations circulating as mandatory come from other frameworks or sector practices. An auditor accepts a justified six months; they do not accept twenty-four months declared in policy and thirty days in the actual system.
In the 2022 revision the most directly involved controls are 5.15 on access control, 5.16 on identity management, 5.17 on authentication information, 5.18 on access rights, 8.5 on secure authentication, 8.15 on logging and 8.16 on monitoring activities, plus 5.14 on information transfer and 8.24 on the use of cryptography. Control 8.16 is the one requiring active correlation in the SIEM, not just archiving.
LoginMaster records the security-relevant event categories — authentication, 2FA verification, sessions, administration, security — and makes them available through HMAC-SHA256 signed webhooks and REST APIs, with tenant and project context in every event. The native connector to enterprise SIEMs, with Syslog CEF over TLS and per-category selection, is on the roadmap. In the meantime forwarding is implemented by consuming the webhooks and relaying events to the collector, the pattern most custom integrations use.
With four verifiable elements: append-only writing, meaning no application path modifies or deletes a recorded event; separation of duties between whoever administers the system and whoever administers the log store; immediate forwarding to a third system, so a compromise of the source does not erase the history; time synchronisation via NTP. External forwarding is the most effective requirement and the most often skipped.
Logging, control 8.15, concerns recording and protecting events. Monitoring, control 8.16, concerns detecting anomalous behaviour. A SIEM that receives and archives events satisfies the first and not the second. Monitoring requires active correlation rules — brute force, credential stuffing, impossible travel, privilege escalation, reactivated dormant accounts — exercised with controlled tests whose outcome is archived.
Not with the log of an authorised action, but with the absence of the function from the system, documented at the architectural level. In LoginMaster no administrator can reset a password or disable a user's second factor: the question 'who reset this credential?' needs no answer because it has no possible cases. For an auditor that is stronger evidence than a register of authorised operations, because it does not depend on people's behaviour.
By mapping the fields onto the schema in use before writing rules. The minimum correspondences are: event type to event.action in ECS or cat/name in CEF, timestamp to @timestamp or rt, subject identifier to user.id or suser, outcome to event.outcome, origin address to source.ip or src, tenant and project to organization.id and service.name. Without normalisation, rules only work on one source and break at the first format change.
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