Which access logs and audit evidence you need for ISO 27001 certification, and how they integrate with the SIEM

LoginMaster

For ISO/IEC 27001 certification you do not need to "have logs": you need to be able to demonstrate, for each Annex A control concerning access, which event constitutes its evidence, with which fields, for how long it is retained and who cannot alter it. The minimum core is successful and failed authentications, second-factor events, session lifecycle, changes to access rights and administrative actions — each with actor, object, UTC timestamp, origin, outcome and tenant and project context.

Step 1 — From controls to events

The Annex A controls of the 2022 revision do not list log events: they describe objectives. The work is translating each objective into the evidence that demonstrates it, and this table is the document worth taking into the audit.

ControlSubjectEvidence to produce
5.15 Access controlAccess rules defined and enforcedPer project and role policies, plus access decision logs
5.16 Identity managementIdentity lifecycleSubject creation, modification, suspension and deactivation events
5.17 Authentication informationManagement of credentials and second factors2FA activation, credential change, recovery and backup code generation events
5.18 Access rightsAssignment and periodic review of rightsRole assignment logs plus periodic reconciliation reports
5.14 Information transferProtection of data in transitEncrypted channel configuration and its verification
8.5 Secure authenticationRobustness of the authentication processSuccessful and failed authentication events, lockouts, second-factor usage
8.15 LoggingRecording of relevant events and their protectionEvent catalogue, fields, retention, integrity controls
8.16 Monitoring activitiesDetection of anomalous behaviourCorrelation rules active in the SIEM and the alerts they raise
8.24 Use of cryptographyAppropriate use of cryptographic mechanismsAlgorithms and key management, token signing, credential protection

Step 2 — The fields every record must carry

A log missing one of these fields is not useless, but it is not correlatable: and correlation is what separates an archive from a control.

FieldContentWhy it is needed
UTC timestampEvent instant with explicit timezoneCorrelate sources across timezones without ambiguity
Event typeStable, machine-readable identifierBuild rules that do not break every time a label changes
ActorIdentifier of the acting subjectAnswer the 'who' question
ObjectIdentifier of the affected subject or resourceDistinguish acting on oneself from acting on another user
OutcomeSucceeded, failed, denied by policyFailures are more informative than successes
OriginIP address and user agentDetect anomalous origins and parallel sessions
ContextTenant and projectScope investigations to a single customer in multi-tenant environments
Session identifierSession referenceReconstruct a chain of events as one story
Event identifierUnique keyDeduplicate repeated deliveries and reference the event in a report
An authentication record, structured
{
  "id": "evt_7c1e2f",
  "type": "subject.authentication_failed",
  "createdAt": "2026-09-10T09:24:00Z",
  "tenant": "https://tenant.example.com",
  "data": {
    "subjectId": "sub_9f2a7c",
    "project": "prj_12ab",
    "outcome": "failed",
    "reason": "invalid_second_factor",
    "sourceIp": "203.0.113.42",
    "sessionId": "ses_1a9c4d"
  }
}

The subject is an opaque reference, not a name: the association with the person lives in the customer tenant. That is a useful property for the SIEM too, because it allows correlation without replicating personal data into a second system.

Step 3 — Retention, without the myths

One clarification that saves arguments: ISO 27001 does not mandate a log retention period. It mandates that the period be defined against business, legal and contractual requirements, that it be documented and that logs be protected throughout. The durations circulating as mandatory come from other frameworks or sector practices.

Event categoryReference durationTypical rationale
Authentication (successful and failed)12 monthsCovers a full audit cycle and retrospective investigations
Second-factor events12-24 monthsKey evidence when an access is disputed
Access rights changesRelationship duration + limitation periodThey show when a privilege was granted and revoked
Administrative actions24 monthsHighest impact, lowest frequency events
Sessions3-6 monthsHigh volume, investigative value concentrated in the short term

The middle column holds reference values, not prescriptions: the point is that your organisation picks its own, justifies them and honours them. An auditor accepts a justified 6 months; they do not accept 24 months declared and 30 days in practice.

Step 4 — Integrity: the forgotten control

Control 8.15 requires logs to be protected from tampering and unauthorised access. Translated into verifiable requirements:

  • Append-only writing: no application path modifies or deletes an already recorded event.
  • Separation of duties: whoever administers the system does not administer the log store.
  • Immediate forwarding to a third system, so a compromise of the source does not erase the history.
  • Time synchronisation via NTP, otherwise the timeline reconstruction of an incident does not hold.
  • Tracing access to the logs themselves: consulting them is an event too.

Forwarding to a third system is the most effective requirement and the most often skipped: if logs stay only in the system producing them, whoever takes control of that system also controls the evidence.

A special case: actions the system does not allow

In architectures where certain operations do not exist — in LoginMaster no administrator can reset a password or disable a user's second factor — the corresponding control is demonstrated differently and more strongly: not with the log of an authorised action, but with the absence of the function from the system. You bring the architectural description to the auditor, and the question "who reset this credential?" needs no answer because it has no possible cases. Details on authentication vendors that cannot read passwords.

Step 5 — Getting events into the SIEM

LoginMaster records all security-relevant event categories — authentication, second-factor verification, sessions, administration, security — and makes them available to applications through HMAC-SHA256 signed webhooks and REST APIs. The native connector to enterprise SIEMs, with Syslog CEF over TLS and per-category selection, is on the roadmap: the current status is on the SIEM integration page. In the meantime forwarding is implemented by consuming the webhooks and relaying events to the collector, which is the pattern most custom integrations use anyway.

Subscribing to security events
POST /v1/projects/prj_12ab/webhooks HTTP/1.1
Host: api.loginmaster.it
Authorization: Bearer ak_live_••••••••
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "url": "https://collector.example.com/hooks/loginmaster",
  "events": [
    "subject.authenticated",
    "subject.role_changed",
    "subject.deactivated"
  ]
}

Field normalisation is the step that makes events usable alongside other sources. The minimum mapping to the most common schemas:

Event fieldCEFElastic Common Schema
typecat / nameevent.action
createdAtrt@timestamp
data.subjectIdsuseruser.id
data.outcomeoutcomeevent.outcome
data.sourceIpsrcsource.ip
tenantcs1organization.id
data.projectcs2service.name
idexternalIdevent.id

Step 6 — The correlation rules to enable

Control 8.16 is about monitoring, not archiving: a SIEM that receives events and does not correlate them satisfies logging, not monitoring. These are the rules covering the most relevant access scenarios, and the ones an auditor expects to find active.

RuleConditionWhat it catches
Brute forceN failed authentications on the same subject in a short windowDictionary attack on a known account
Credential stuffingFailures across many different subjects from the same originReuse of leaked credentials
Impossible travelTwo successful authentications from geographically incompatible originsShared credentials or a stolen session
Second factor bypassedSuccessful authentication with no second-factor event on a project requiring itMisconfiguration or an alternative path
Privilege escalationAn administrative role assigned outside the expected processAbuse of an administrative account
Dormant account reactivatedSuccessful authentication after long inactivityUse of a forgotten but never disabled account
Out-of-hours administrative activityAdministrative actions outside the operating windowUnauthorised access or an undeclared automation
Repeated recovery attemptsSeveral credential recovery requests on the same subjectSocial engineering in progress

Every rule should be exercised with a controlled test and the result archived: proof that the rule works is more convincing than the rule itself.

Audit day: what gets asked

  1. 1'Show me every access by this user in the last 90 days.' It must be a query, not a manual extraction.
  2. 2'Who assigned this administrative role, and when?' You need the actor, not just the change.
  3. 3'How do you prove nobody altered these logs?' Append-only, separation of duties, external forwarding.
  4. 4'Show me the last periodic review of access rights.' The dated reconciliation report.
  5. 5'What happens when someone attempts a brute-force attack?' Active rule, alert raised, test outcome.
  6. 6'How long do you retain these events and where is that written?' The policy, and evidence it is honoured.
  7. 7'Who can reset a user's credentials?' If the answer is 'nobody, the function does not exist', the entire following family of questions falls away.

The reconciliation report mentioned in point four comes from automating the lifecycle: the procedure is in User provisioning and lifecycle via REST API and SDK. The overall compliance picture, including NIS2 and GDPR, is on compliance.

Comparing collection approaches

AspectScattered application logsSelf-hosted IdPManaged IAM platform
CompletenessEach application records what its team decidedComplete on the IdP, to be integrated for the restHomogeneous event catalogue across all projects
FormatHeterogeneous, normalised by handConsistentConsistent and documented
IntegrityThe application team can modify its own logsDepends on configurationAppend-only events, forwardable in real time
Multi-tenant contextTo be addedPer realmNative: tenant and project in every event
Evidence on credentialsLog of the administrative resetLog of the administrative resetNo administrative reset to trace: it does not exist
Audit preparation costHigh: manual reconstructionMediumLow: the control-to-event map is already defined

Who wrote this guide

LoginMaster is the IAM platform of CDBKR S.r.l., an Italian company that designs and operates authentication infrastructure for software houses, MSPs and European enterprise organisations, with specific attention to European compliance requirements. The event categories cited are those published on SIEM integration, and the full regulatory picture is on compliance. To discuss a certification path: contact us.

Frequently asked questions

The minimum core covers successful and failed authentications, second-factor events (activation, verification, recovery, backup codes), session lifecycle, access rights changes and administrative actions. Every record must carry actor, object, UTC timestamp, origin, outcome, tenant and project context and a unique identifier. What the standard really asks for is not the event list but the map linking each Annex A control to the evidence that demonstrates it.

The standard does not mandate a duration. It mandates that the duration be defined against business, legal and contractual requirements, documented, and that logs be protected throughout. Durations circulating as mandatory come from other frameworks or sector practices. An auditor accepts a justified six months; they do not accept twenty-four months declared in policy and thirty days in the actual system.

In the 2022 revision the most directly involved controls are 5.15 on access control, 5.16 on identity management, 5.17 on authentication information, 5.18 on access rights, 8.5 on secure authentication, 8.15 on logging and 8.16 on monitoring activities, plus 5.14 on information transfer and 8.24 on the use of cryptography. Control 8.16 is the one requiring active correlation in the SIEM, not just archiving.

LoginMaster records the security-relevant event categories — authentication, 2FA verification, sessions, administration, security — and makes them available through HMAC-SHA256 signed webhooks and REST APIs, with tenant and project context in every event. The native connector to enterprise SIEMs, with Syslog CEF over TLS and per-category selection, is on the roadmap. In the meantime forwarding is implemented by consuming the webhooks and relaying events to the collector, the pattern most custom integrations use.

With four verifiable elements: append-only writing, meaning no application path modifies or deletes a recorded event; separation of duties between whoever administers the system and whoever administers the log store; immediate forwarding to a third system, so a compromise of the source does not erase the history; time synchronisation via NTP. External forwarding is the most effective requirement and the most often skipped.

Logging, control 8.15, concerns recording and protecting events. Monitoring, control 8.16, concerns detecting anomalous behaviour. A SIEM that receives and archives events satisfies the first and not the second. Monitoring requires active correlation rules — brute force, credential stuffing, impossible travel, privilege escalation, reactivated dormant accounts — exercised with controlled tests whose outcome is archived.

Not with the log of an authorised action, but with the absence of the function from the system, documented at the architectural level. In LoginMaster no administrator can reset a password or disable a user's second factor: the question 'who reset this credential?' needs no answer because it has no possible cases. For an auditor that is stronger evidence than a register of authorised operations, because it does not depend on people's behaviour.

By mapping the fields onto the schema in use before writing rules. The minimum correspondences are: event type to event.action in ECS or cat/name in CEF, timestamp to @timestamp or rt, subject identifier to user.id or suser, outcome to event.outcome, origin address to source.ip or src, tenant and project to organization.id and service.name. Without normalisation, rules only work on one source and break at the first format change.

Want to see LoginMaster in action?

Request a personalized demo and discover how to manage identities and access securely and compliantly.